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Abstract
The year 2003 involved a considerable change in Hungarian energy market. Liberalization of the
formerly fully regulated electricity market began, and some practical experiences already presented
themselves, as well as the new act on partial market-opening of the gas-segment came into being.
The lifting of the monopole situation raised some theoretical and practical questions, on which the
answer was given on the one hand by the rethought regulation, on the other hand by actors entering
the market. In both areas there are interesting conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing events and
from the experienced phenomena as well.
In this study we endeavour to provide a resume about the theoretical background concerning
the governmental regulation of the situations mentioned above.
Keywords: deregulation, liberalization, energy market, government failures, grid-base services, nat-
ural monopoly, regulation, regulatory authority.
1. Theoretical Background
The economic theory is widely engaged in the question of effectiveness, distribution
and wealth-increase as functions of the market. These analyses correspond with
each other in the respect that they apply a wide range of stipulations to specify
the notion of the market. A real market which fulfils these functions will have to
be in possession of many attributes [21]. An appropriate number of sellers and
buyers have to be present who are informed perfectly (or at least considerably and
symmetrically), the cost and benefits must be defined, and the commodities have to
be homogeneous1. These conditions rarely rule altogether. Nevertheless, if lack of
the different conditions results in the imperfect operation of the market, we need to
put additional analytical tools into action in order to understand them, which means
inspecting the market failures.
Nowadays, only a few people believe in the omnipotence of the market. In the
modern market economies the significant part of the goods and services are not dis-
tributed via pure market competition. This does not mean that the state distribution
1Further stipulation can be taken on the available technologies or obstacles to enter the market
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systems substituting or completing the market would be free from failures. On the
contrary, their functioning is attached to many mistakes and defects [15]. In many
cases, their operation and maintenance produce better outcome than the classical
market which can be defeated or still-born in a particular area. The question is
how we can make such a reasonable compromise on social level which ensures the
market or economic effectiveness as well as the optimal quantity of the production
parallel with reasonable prices, and this way provides relative satisfaction for social
partners at the same time.
It is generally thought that the competitive factors lead to high degree of effi-
ciency [10] and that competition is one of the most dominant motives of innovation.
In the course of the past two hundred years also the economists recognized that there
were certain circumstances under which the market did not work perfectly. In the
literature of the recent years therefore, market failures are cited as an argument for
governmental intervention [25].
The activity of the state aiming at restricting individual freedom calls for
special justification since market is an automatism. If we leave something in the
scope of themarket automatism, nothing is left to be done, therewill be amechanism
which will manage the production, distribution and financing of the goods. But if
a problem is taken out from the scope of the decentralized automatisms, then these
quite sophisticated tasks one by one must be performed by someone presumably.
Regarding the nature[4] of the government’s role, it is an important ques-
tion, whether the intervention could be justified by arguments on effectiveness and
fairness or simply by an a priori statement on characteristics of goods.
The traditional argumentation of the economics of welfare considers the cor-
rection of the market failures and the endeavour to make the distribution more
equitable, a mission where we have to recline upon the instrumentality of the state.
The role of the state can be justified by the fact that the market cannot solve certain
matters. The market – a spontaneous, decentralized co-operation of the citizens,
resulted in amechanism which supplies the necessities, – is the basic instance where
state plays role only if the earlier mentioned is defeated2.
According to the invisible hand hypothesis the market allocation is effective
automatically just when every standard condition is fulfilled [16]. In this case the
intervention is not justifiable by arguments in terms of efficiency. But if one or
more conditions are not granted then the realized equilibrium is not effective, so in
this case some kinds of government action could be appropriate.
What can justify the efficacy of the government participation? The school
of market failures proceeds from the fact that the normal, effective work of the
market has preconditions. Since these may be quite strict in certain cases, it can
easily happen that these conditions are not completely realized in certain market
segments [11], and so the market mechanism fails or it results in an ineffective
supply or abnormal demand.
The extent and depth in which the state takes its role need to be considered
thoroughly. Taking the attitude of the state to the market regulation into account
2Others have different opinion [19]
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the possible approach [26] is defining the regulation interfering with the market
processes by orders and also the regulation which concerns setting up the frames
of the market processes as basic types. The former one prescribes for the actors
how to behave, therefore it violates the essential welfare-optimizing function of the
competition, while the latter just controls the framework for the game and thus it
can go on freely. In addition to these basic categories there are many transitional
forms. It is an often applied method that the government prescribes rules for the
price formation or for the accounting of the costs, but beyond these the actors are
free to set the prices. Examples can be found in the area of communication and
informatics like regulations for the reference bid or offer and also for connection
fees and terms, especially in the case of the dominant market participants3 .
On the basis of the examination of the theoretical foundation of Hungarian
regulation [30] it can be said that a regulation relating to the prices can be admitted if
the given company is in a dominant position on a definite market and the instructions
of the competition act are not sufficient to prevent from taking unfair advantage of
the market power.
The efficiency of the competition is based on several primary conditions. The
lack of these conditions indicates a serious risk on the function of effectiveness of
the market. However, it can be improved [24].
It means a special situation indeed, if the customer, cost-holder and the con-
sumer are not the same person. The most conspicuous precedent is the area of the
subsidized medicines. A doctor writes out the prescription, the patient makes the
profit out of it and the cost-holder is mainly a sort of common fund. In accordance
with these, one of the basic premises of the rational decision-making (comparing
costs and benefits) gets damaged. The facts demonstrate it. The over-utilization
of the health- and social security systems of the developed countries can be traced
back to the anomaly emerging in this decision-making situation.
In accordance with the experiences of the regulation and subsidization of the
pharmaceuticals over the last decade the GVH recommends [12] to bring a new
law independent of Price Act for controlling the medicine market, to get out the
medicine market from the scope of the general regulation, and to manage it by
considering the special attributes.
The regulation can generate improving efficiency if there is no available in-
formation on price and quality in the case of certain services [23]. Local natural
monopolies, externalities and common goods may cause that supply or demand is
not efficient.
The existence ofmonopolies reduces the efficiency of themarket coordination
on agiven area, what results in higher prices or lower output [8], generally, compared
to the optimum of competitive market. This means losses for the society [21]. On
the other hand, the scale efficiency can reach such extent, that the monopoly ensures
the lowest unit cost or because of the characteristics of the products or the services
the production of the given good is able to be realized efficiently in the frame of a
monopoly.
3In Hungary this task is performed by the National Communications Authority
226 J. BÉCSI
The grid-base services were a good example of this for quite a long time. The
regulation was managed by classic monopoly control rules in certain cases [6], but
in other cases the state performed the activity itself. During the last years a change
occurred in relation to the view of the control and even to the market structure. The
reform was addressed chiefly to deregulate, namely to abandon regulation what
causes exaggerated and unnecessary cost and losses as well as to create the chance
for the competition on areas where it is possible4. On the other hand, the change of
approaches and the increasing efficiency are needed where the control is expedient
to be maintained.
These goals are present in Hungary as well. Over the last years laws sprung up
[1] [2] opening the formerly strictly or fully controlled markets in quick succession,
which did not leave the regulatory system invariable. The new acts have already
been made on the field of electricity and natural gas, but the reform did not appeared
on other areas. In the near future the regulation of the railway and road passenger
transport needs to be liberalized. A new act on telecommunication is being made.
As we will see, the uninterrupted operation of the models is insured as the sphere
of powers and competences of the new regulatory authorities are only in the phase
of forming ideas.
The primary mission of all elements of the regulating system, formed to
control monopolies, is dedicated to protect the consumers. The authorities are
actors of essential importance for consumer protection, but the interests of the
companies under regulation have also to be respected. The companies must not
suffer unjustified disadvantages or losses; the control is not allowed to jeopardize
their viability, the interest of investors and share-holders must not get injured [18].
The authorities must balance between contrary and conflicting interests. The
system – in order to correct themistakes – is completed with superior level to appeal.
The balance between the actors of the regulated markets, including the authority,
should be created here [28]. Decisions of authorities – especially concerning prices
and tariffs – can be questioned by the persons involved in the affair. The consumers
could have a grievance because of the too high prices, so could the companies for
the too low prices. The authority is allowed to initiate proceedings if the company
does not follow the order.
The regulatory authorities have special role in forming the legal framework for
Hungarian economy [13]. The legislative body forms the general rules by bringing
laws, the courts interpret and apply the will of the parliament, while the authority is
in direct relationship with actors involved under regulation, it controls them within
the normal market processes.
This control, however, does not mean absolute control [29] over the com-
panies’ competence, in particular it does not mean taking over the management
functions. The management of the company goes on a regulated market as it goes
4On the one hand these costs are explicit costs emerged from administrative obligations required
by the authority, on the other hand these may be opportunity costs arisen from the lower efficiency
compared to the market. Remember the dead weight losses on social level caused by classical
monopolies, thus this latter is not necessary to be present if the regulation is appropriate.
ENERGY MARKET IN HUNGARY 227
on markets in general; it remains in the sphere of competence of the owners and
managers. The authority examines the decisions made and initiated by the man-
agement subsequently. In case of cancelled or inappropriate decisions the authority
should initiate a procedure for correction as well.
It is very important to determine what kinds of rights and powers disposes the
authority5, andwhat extendof its competence reaches to supervise. It is fundamental
that this competence covers the output-side only, so it comprehends the activities
and behaviours relating to the services. Its most important elements are price,
quality, obligation to supply or to enter into a contract and also some other linked
sub-areas.
The sphere of competence of the authority is determined by laws. These laws
can also prescribe the conditions on which these proceedings should be executed
under certain circumstances. Laws may provide the course of examination, prepa-
ration and execution of the supervision, as well as the frames and methods of the
decision-making. It is also true, that these prescriptions and instructions are rough
and general, so they mean a framework only, and the authorities have access to form
their own detailed systems, to specify their own constitutional and operational rules
which are approved by a supervisory body in general.
The formed course of actions, based on rules laid in laws, beyond the articulate
control of executing the activity, includes the methods and forms of the connection
to the companies and consumers as well as to the superior, and it also includes the
obligation to report.
2. Practical Issues
The Hungarian practice is different from this scheme. The authority is not allowed
to make itemized decision on the prices. The restraint of the free entering into a
contract must be a decree based on law or must be an act. The decree can only
be governmental, ministerial or municipal. So in Hungary the authorities just take
the preliminary steps in decisions on prices and control their execution. Based on
special acts on certain branches the governmental or ministerial decree can detail
the rules and principles to form and change the administered maximum prices. The
Act on Prices [3] as a framework law does not dispose over these. The requirements
for the supply-safety or the recultivation, the technological, environmental require-
ments which are dominant factors in view of prices and expenditures are specifiable
in special laws for branches only. The social interest is not the lowest price (as a
short-term interest) but it follows the aforesaid requirements as long-term interests.
The principles on the price formatting should be harmonized to the short and long-
term interests. The special acts may give orders on the functions of authorities in the
course of preliminary steps for settling the price, functions relating to supervision
as well as on the specific field of consumer protection.
5The topic is fully detailed by [27]
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If the price regulation-type intervention is possible to be applied on a certain
market, then it is expedient to consider all types of intervention, and to choose
the slightest one in order to achieve the goals as well as not to change the usual
market conditions at greater extent than appropriate. This means transitional types
of regulation, which cannot be defined as direct intervention concerning prices.
Laws may prescribe orders on separating the expenditures (in order to prevent from
cross-financing and to make the justified cost transparent) as well as to hold price
level limitation (a.k.a. price cap).
In the relationship between the authority and the companies the rights of the
companies involved under control are essential issues as well. There are important
questions regarding disputing the decision of the authority and the possibilities for
correction. This means a body of appeal in general, where the questioned decision
is judged. In Hungary a company is not allowed to turn to a court of law, but it is
allowed to apply for new decision on prices. This ensures the chance of correction.
In order to assesswhether the statemakesmistakes during intervention into the
market mechanism by orders and regulatory authorities, namely to define what sorts
of mistakes it makes, and to specify the nature of the government failures [25], we
need to look over all those anomalies which appear in the sphere of the supervisory
system. If these anomalies are unambiguously caused by the unsatisfactory model
of the authority, the reform of regulation or the omission of the unnecessary element
can improve the system. The latter one is possible primarily if the market has a
good chance to converge the social optimum by controlling itself.
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